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Opinions and Expert Testimony 
John w. Reed 
The rules in Article VII of the new Michigan Rules of 
Evidence, with two significant exceptions, are identi-
cal with the corresponding federal rules. Article VII, 
especially in the federal version, has been thought 
to effect a significant liberalization of the opinion 
rules. Indeed, I have heard and read alarmist state-
ments to the effect that the rules regarding expert 
opinion permit courts to transfer some of the fact-
finding process to experts. Though exaggerated, there 
is at least a grain of truth there. 
Opinion testimony is now more freely admitted and 
plays a much larger role in dispute settling than it 
did only a generation ago. Partly as a consequence of 
the increasing complexity of facts in controversy and 
an increase in technical and scientific questions, 
experts are virtually indispensable if court and jury 
are to comprehend. Also, more generous use of opinion 
is a consequence of a general, if not unanimous, 
perception that jurors are more sophisticated than 
previously and can distinguish and evaluate opinion as 
separate from the underlying facts better than when 
the rule against opinion came into being long ago. In 
addition, it is difficult to draw lines between fact 
and opinion, particularly in the area of lay opinion. 
When a lay witness, while trying to state something as 
·best he can, uses opinion language-e.g., some adjec-
tives or adverbs-he may be told, "That is opinion, you 
cannot testify that way." The witness does not know 
what to say next; his tongue is tied. Indeed, that 1s 
often the very reason the objection is interposed. 
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In the aggregate the new rules represent very little 
change from current Michigan case law on the subject. 
Nevertheless, they support the slant toward greater 
willingness on the part of the courts to receive 
opinions of all kinds. 
Rule 701 governs the use of lay opinion. It pro-
vides, in essence, that the lay person may testify in 
the form of opinion or inference if his testimony is 
rationally based on his own perception and is helpful 
to the trier of fact. For example, testimony would 
still be excluded from an individual who says that he 
was in his backyard, heard the screeching of tires out 
front, heard the crash, ran around the house, and saw 
one car over against the curb "that had been hit by the 
other car backing out of the driveway." The witness 
does not know what happened; he does not have firsthand 
knowledge. He simply has seen the positions of the cars 
and their condition. He is not better able than the 
jurors to draw conclusions from the debris. He does 
have firsthand knowledge of the debris and can testify 
to that. May he then go ahead and testify to his 
inferences--that the one must have backed into the side 
of the other? MRE 701 states in clause (b) that the 
opinion testimony must be "helpful to a clear under-
standing of ••• [the] testimony or the determination 
of a fact in issue." Surely in the preceding example 
every court will determine that the evidence is not 
helpful. 
The impact statement following Rule 701 in the pro-
posed rules noted that the rule is essentially consis-
tent with existing Michigan law and practice. One word 
should be emphasized, however: "helpful." As in MRE 702 
where the word is "assist," the test of admissibility 
is whether the opinion will help. Previously, the test 
of admissibility of expert opinion was often put in 
terms of whether the testimony in the form of opinion 
was "necessary" in order that the witness could commu-
nicate or the juror could understand. If a relatively 
inarticulate witness offered to describe a room as 
being "a mess," he might be allowed to testify in those 
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terms if he was unable to break down his observations 
into elements such as torn drapes, pictures askew, and 
an overturned sofa. He could testify in that opinion-
ated form in order to communicate what he knew. Rule 
701 does not insist on necessity-that the witness be 
feebleminded and without alternative form of communi-
cation in order to be permitted to express opinion. The 
evidence is admissible if it is "helpful" to a clear 
understanding. 
In the expert opinion area, doctors for example have 
long been permitted to testify to the likelihood of 
permanence of plaintiff's disability because only a 
doctor can provide that information. The fact finder 
needs the expert to interpret the data. But Rule 702, 
like 701, is phrased in terms not of need but of help, 
of assistance, in communicating and understanding. 
Rule 702 authorizes the reception of expert opinion 
if the court "determines that recognized scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact •••• " Together, MRE 701 and 702 
condition the courts to be more receptive to opinion 
testimony. 
Who is an expert? Rule 702 contemplates a greater 
than average knowledge about a subject matter. The cre-
dentials may consist of knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, and the threshold is low. It 
is relatively easy to qualify a witness as an expert, 
leaving the judgment of weight for the jury. 
Under Rule 703, the facts or data upon which an 
expert bases his opinion or inference may be made known 
to him in any of several ways. They may be "perceived by 
or made known to him at or before the hearing." The 
expert need not base his opinion on his own perception. 
He may obtain his data from some other source. The data 
may even be made known to him at the hearing by a hypo-
thetical question or by listening to the witnesses. 
The second sentence of Rule 703 as proposed (but not 
adopted) followed the federal rule in providing that 
the underlying data need not be admissible if it is 
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
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particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon 
the subject. Thus, for example, the orthopedic surgeon 
may reach a conclusion as to what is wrong with 
plaintiff's leg based in part on the radiologist's 
report which is not otherwise admissible at trial for 
lack of foundation. The surgeon may testify in reliance 
on the report since he and other orthopedists would 
rely on it. Rule 703 as promulgated, however, made the 
matter discretionary with the court: "The court may 
require that underlying facts or data essential to an 
opinion or inference be in evidence." It would appear 
that unless the court requires it, the data need not 
be in evidence. One suspects that where an opinion is 
virtually dispositive of the case, the court probably 
will insist that the bases on which the opinion is 
founded be presented in evidence. Thus, the trial 
counsel must be prepared to present the underlying data 
in admissible form. Being prepared to do so and in the 
interest of more persuasive advocacy, he may as well 
introduce that proof. In any event, he cannot afford to 
rely on the hope that the judge will not require the 
underlying data. Rule 703 is a slight change from prior 
practice, but much closer to present practice than the 
federal version. 
Rule 704, making it unobjectionable that the opinion 
embraces an ultimate issue in the case, represents no 
change in existing practice with respect to experts. 
There is some question, however, about whether Rule 704 
changes the rule as applied to lay opinion. Ordinarily, 
lay persons may not express opinions on so-called 
ultimate issues. But consider a case of intoxication. 
The basic facts are that the defendant had the odor of 
alcohol on his breath, he was staggering, he was thick 
of speech, his eyes were watery, and so on. A lay 
witness can testify to those facts, of course. Most 
courts, however, would also let the witness say, "He 
appeared to me to be intoxicated." Assume then such 
testimony in a dramshop case where the issue is whether 
the customer was intoxicated when served. Rule 704 
makes unavailing the objection that intoxication hap-
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pens to be an ultimate issue in the case. It may be that 
under Rule 701 the testimony is inadmissible because it 
is not "helpful"; but it would not be objectionable on 
the ground that it is an ultimate issue in the case. 
Rule 705, regarding disclosure of the facts under-
lying an expert's opinion, is also an embodiment of 
existing law in Michigan. Consider the following possi-
bility: a party puts his medical witness on the stand, 
and the court, under Rule 702, finds him an expert. 
Q. Doctor, have you looked at the plaintiff's 
medical record in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether his dis-
ability is permanent? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What is that opinion? 
A. It is permanent. 
Q. Thank you, Doctor. Your witness. 
The adversary now has the choice to dismiss the witness 
with no cross-examination, suggesting that his opinion 
is of no importance, or cross-examine him with respect 
to the bases of his opinion, thus entering a minefield. 
In theory Rule 705 permits the direct examination set 
forth, but it is poor advocacy. An expert is ordinarily 
not much better than the clarity with which he indi-
cates to the jury how he reached his results. Merely to 
offer a bald opinion like the one above, even though 
contemplated as a possibility under 705, seems most 
unwise. 
Rule 706 provides for court-appointed experts, a 
novelty in Michigan practice. The court may appoint an 
expert on motion of the parties, but it may do it also 
on its own motion. The expert may be called to testify 
by the court or by either party, and he or she is 
subject to cross-examination by either party, whether 
called by the court or by one of the parties. Compen-
sation may be taxed against the parties in civil cases 
or paid out of the state funds in certain criminal 
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situations. Under Rule 706(d) the parties may still 
call experts of their own selection, thus preserving 
the right of a party to have his own witnesses. But 
Rule 706(c) rather reduces the value of that right, 
permitting the court in its discretion to authorize 
disclosure to the jury of the fact that one of these 
witnesses is the court's witness. Undoubtedly, that 
disclosure will enhance the credibility of the court's 
witness in relation to the parties' witnesses. Rule 706 
represents an erosion of the adversary system, but it 
erodes an area in which the system has been subject to 
a lot of criticism (the "hired gun" expert). Whether 
courts actually appoint expert witnesses under the 
rule, the potential power to do so may cause trial 
lawyers to be more conservative in their choices of 
forensic experts. That, many would argue, is a salutary 
result of the rule. 
